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Abstract 
How does competitive arms accumulation affect investment and capital accumulation? 
In a dynamic optimization framework including both investment and military spending, 
we find that, when the utility function is separable between consumption and the weapon 
stocks, an unanticipated rise in current military threat reduces current investment and an 
anticipated  rise  in  future  military  threat  stimulates  current  investment.  But  when  the 
utility function is nonseparable between consumption and the  weapon  stocks,  a current 
military  threat  may  not  decrease  the  short-run  investment.  In  the  long  run,  capital 
accumulation is  independent  of the military conflicts among countries regardless of the 
form  of the  utility  function. 
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1.  Introduction 
This  paper  examines  both  long-run  and  short-run  responses  of  military 
spending  and  investment  to  competitive  arms  accumulation  in  a  dynamic 
optimization model over an infinite horizon. 
This approach is  well justified  for two  reasons.  First,  the  relation  between 
military  spending and capital accumulation has recently  received considerable 
attention in policy  discussions and empirical studies; see Deger and Sen (1983, 
1992), Deger (1986), Hewitt (1991), McNamara (1992), Landau (1992), among 
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others. Even though there are strong arguments for the existence of a negative 
impact of military tension on productive investment and output growth, empiri­
cal analysis often indicates some ambiguous effects or even a weak but positive 
effect; see Deger and Sen (1983) and Landau (1992). In addition, cross-country 
examination also shows that defense spending definitely reduces national saving 
ratios; see Deger (1986). Up till now, a well-grounded theoretical interpretation 
for these empirical findings is still lacking. Overall, empirical studies in this field 
have not explicitly modeled the dynamic relation among investment, consump­
tion, and military spending. And very often some simple regression equations are 
estimated by putting military  spending either as a dependent variable in Hewitt 
(1991) or as an explanatory variable in Landau (1992).  If we derive the dynamics 
of investment and military spending from explicit dynamic optimization based 
on exogenously given preference, technology, military tension, and other factors, 
then  not  only  can  we  verify  whether  empirical  findings  are  consistent  with 
theoretical  predictions,  but  we can also  provide insights  on  how  to  test  the 
relation between military  spending and investment  in econometric studies. 
Second, numerous theoretical studies on military spending often take output 
as given or ignore capital accumulation while focusing on the competitive arms 
accumulation  in  the  dynamic  games  played by  two  countries  in  a  state  of 
confrontation. This long tradition begins with Richardson (1960) and continues 
with Saaty (1968), Brito (1972), Simaan and Cruz (1975), Intriligator (1975), and 
Intriligator and Brito (1976). For more recent studies along this line, see Deger 
and Sen (1984) and van der Ploeg and Zeeuw (1990). 
In this paper we set up a dynamic optimization model including both capital 
and arms accumulation. We consider a typical country, say the home country, 
which is in a state of actual or potential military  confrontation with a foreign 
country. The home country  derives positive utility  from its consumption and 
military defense services but disutility from the potential threat or invasion by 
the foreign country. When the foreign military threat rises, how should the home 
country  respond? Intuitively,  there exist two alternatives.  One way  is for the 
home country  to cut both investment arid consumption in the short run and 
devote  more  resource  to  arms  accumulation;  thus,  investment  is  reduced  as 
a  result  of  rising  military  tension. But  the  home  country  can  take  another 
approach by reducing current consumption and increasing both investment and 
military spending in the short run. That will lead to a higher capital stock and 
a higher weapon stock in the home country. The expanding capital stock means 
a growing output, which in turn makes more consumption and military spend­
ing  possible  in  the  home  country.  In  this  way,  the  rising  military  tension 
accelerates  the  short-run  investment  and  capital  accumulation  in  the  home 
country. 
Which approach should the home country  take? In this paper,  we find that 
the answer crucially depends on the occurring time of the military threat and the 
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between consumption and the weapon stocks, we find that an unanticipated rise 
in current military threat reduces current investment and an anticipated rise in 
future military threat stimulates current investment. But when the utility func­
tion is  nonseparable  between  consumption  and the weapon stocks,  a current 
military  threat may  not decrease the short-run investment. In the long run,  no 
matter whether the utility  function is separable or nonseparable,  capital accu­
mulation is determined by the famous modified golden rule,  which is indepen­
dent of the military  conflicts among countries. 
We organize this paper as follows. In Section 2, we set up the basic model with 
the utility function separable between consumption and the weapon stocks. In 
Section 3,  we  discuss  the  stability  and the long-run  equilibrium of the basic 
model. In Section 4, we demonstrate the short-run responses of both investment 
and  military  spending  to  different  military  shocks  for  the  separable  utility 
function. We  consider  the  model  with  the  nonseparable  utility  function  in 
Section 5 and conclude this paper in Section 6. 
2.  The model 
There  are  two  countries in this model:  the  home country  and  the foreign 
country, and they are in a state of military confrontation. The preference of the 
home country is defined on consumption c, the home country's weapon stock m, 
and  the  foreign  weapon  stock m*:  U (c, m, m*).  Furthermore  U (c, m, m*)  is 
concave  and  continuously  differentiable in its  arguments.  As in Brito (1972), 
Deger and Sen (1983, 1984), and van der Ploeg and Zeeuw (1990), the following 
assumptions are imposed on the preference of the home country: 
(1) 
(2) 
All assumptions in (1)  are self-evident. The assumption that U23 >  0 in (2) 
implies that an increase in the foreign weapon stock will increase the marginal 
utility of the home weapon stock and defense; see Deger and Sen (1984) for this 
reasoning. But the other two assumptions in (2) might not be accepted without 
some doubts because they raise the question why the utility from consumption 
relates to the weapon stocks. People may argue that the utility  from consump­
tion is independent of the weapon stocks. To take this consideration also into 
our model, we use the signs  '  �  0' and  '  ::s;  0' and make it possible that the utility 
from consumption is independent of the weapon stocks. 
The weapon accumulation in the home country  is 
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where g is military  spending and f> is the depreciation rate of the weapon stock. 
At any  time,  the resource available to the home country  is the output f(k), 
which is increasing and concave in the capital input k. If capital also depreciates 
at the rate f>, then the equation of motion for capital formation is given by 
k=f(k)-c-g-f>k.  (4) 
The production function used in (4) does not depend on the security represented 
by m in our model. Some may say that military spending enhances security and 
hence makes  capital  more productive. In this case,  the positive effect of  the 
military  spending on capital accumulation is so obvious that we do not need 
further proof. To us, the more interesting and, in some sense, the more difficult 
case, is the independence of the production function from security and defense. 
To make our dynamic system more tractable,  we assume that the weapon 
stock  and capital  are  essentially  the  same  good  and they  can  be  added. In 
addition,  we have already  assumed that they have the same depreciation rate 
f> as in Eqs. (3) and (4). 
Due to this assumption,  we can define the total asset in the home country 
as w: 
w  = k  + m.  (5) 
Differentiate (5) with respect to time and use (3) and (4): 
w=f(k)-c-f>w.  (6) 
The home country's ob jective is to maximize a discounted stream of utility 
over an infinite horizon with a positive time discount rate p: 
max [  U(c, m, m*)e-P1 dt , 
sub ject to constraints (3)  and (4)  or,  equivalently,  constraints (5) and (6). The 
initial total asset is given: w(O)  = k(O) + m(O). 
For most part of this paper,  we follow van  der Ploeg  and Zeeuw (1990)  and 
assume that the utility function is separable in consumption and the weapon stocks: 
U(c, m, m*) = u(c)  + v(m, m*).  (7) 
Then,  assumptions (1) and (2)  are modified to be 
u'  > 0,  u" <  0,  v1 > 0,  v11 < 0,  v12  >  0.  (8) H.�f. Zouj Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19 ( 1995) 371- 393  375 
That is to  say,  the utility  from consumption does not depend on the weapon 
stocks. In assuming this separability between consumption and defense, we have 
the  following  advantages.  First,  we  can avoid  the  problem  of  negative  and 
positive effects of the weapon stocks on consumption  just as we have done in the 
case of the production function. Second, this separability makes it very  easy to 
compare our model to the standard neoclassical growth model without arms 
accumulation if we assume the same utility function of consumption, u  (c). Third, 
while the long-run  analysis  in our paper always  holds with and without the 
separability  in  the  utility  function,  a  separable  utility  function  allows  us to 
obtain clear-cut results in our short-run analysis in Section 4. We will point out 
how some ambiguous results will appear in the case of the nonseparable utility 
function in Section 5. 
To solve the optimization problem,  we formulate the corresponding Hamil­
tonian: 
H = u(c) + v(m, m*)  + ).(j(k)-c- bw)  +  y(w-k- m), 
where ). is the marginal utility of one extra unit of the asset, or the shadow price 
of the total asset,  in the home country  and y  is the multiplier for the add-up 
condition or the identity  of the total asset. 
The first-order conditions necessary  for the optimization are 
u' (c)  = ).,  (9) 
v1 (m, m*)  = ).j'(k),  (10) 
w=k+m,  (11) 
�j). = b +  p-f'(k),  (12) 
w = f(k)  - c - bw,  (13) 
lim ).we  -pr  =  0.  (14) 
t-oo 
The explanations for these necessary conditions are straightforward. Eq. (9) 
implies the equality between the marginal utility of one extra unit of asset and 
the marginal utility  of  consumption.  Eq. (10)  says  that  the  marginal rate  of 
substitution between  consumption  and  arms  equals  the  opportunity  cost  of 
arms,  namely,  the marginal productivity  of  capital. Eq. (11)  repeats the asset 
add-up condition (5). The familiar Euler condition is given by Eq. (12),  which 
governs the  optimal choice between consumption and capital accumulation. 
Again, Eq. (13)  is the dynamic budget constraint (6). The usual transversality 
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Instead of  working  with three differential equations  in c, m,  and k, we can 
solve c, m,  and k in terms of A.,  w, and m*,  and substitute them into Eqs. (12) 
and (13). Denote the solutions as c(A., w, m*), m(A., w, m*),  and k(A., w, m*) (see 
Appendix 1 for the properties of these functions) and denote 
h(A., w, m*) = b + p-f'(k(A., w, m*) ), 
g(A., w, m*) = f(k(A., w, m*) )- c(A., w,  m*)- bw, 
then, we have 
A.= A.h(A., w, m*),  (15a) 
w = g(A., w, m*).  (15b) 
In Appendix 1, it is established that h;. > 0, hw > 0, hm• <  0, g;.  >  0, gm• <  0, and 
gw does not possess a definite sign. We will focus on Eqs. (15a)  and (15b)  in 
Sections 3 and 4 of this paper. 
3.  The long-run  effects of the foreign military threat 
Let J:, w,  c, m,  and k be the long-run equilibrium values of the corresponding 




here all the partial derivatives are evaluated at the steady  state values J:  and 
w.  In  the  steady  state,  � =  0  and w =  0  in (15).  The  phase  diagram  is  pre­
sented  in  Fig.  1.  The  �  =  0  locus  is  downward-sloping  because  the  slope 
dA.jdw =-(hw/h;.) is less than  zero. The w  =  0 locus has an ambiguous sign 
because g;. is positive but gw does not have a definite sign from Eq. (A.4e)  of 
Appendix 1. In Fig. 1, we draw the w= 0 locus as a downward-sloping line; the 
dynamics are the same whether it is  upward- or  downward-sloping. For the 
existence of a perfect foresight equilibrium in our mode,  it is required that 





Fig. I.  The phase  di agram and  the effect  of  a  permanent rise in the  foreign military  threat. 
The geometry of the intuition for (17) is that the�= 0 locus is steeper than the 
w  =  0 locus. With condition (17), it is easy to check that the positive eigenvalue 
of the dynamic system is given by 
(18a) 
and the negative eigenvalue is 
J.l2  = [(}:h;. + 9w)- j(A.h;. + 9w)2 
- 4.1' ]/2 <  0.  (18b) 
As there is one negative eigenvalue J.Lz  corresponding to one state variable w and 
one positive eigenvalue 111  corresponding to one jumping variable )0,  the  dy­
namic system (15) has a unique perfect foresight path converging to the steady 
state. It is important to note that,  without (17),  we  will have  either a totally 
unstable  dynamic  system (i.e.,  two  positive  eigenvalues)  or  a  totally  stable 
dynamic system (i.e., two negative eigenvalues). In the former, we cannot do too 
much analysis on effects of exogenous shocks because any perturbation to the 
dynamic system will lead to either an explosive or a corner solution. In the latter, 
a unique perfect foresight equilibrium does not exist because any initial point in 
the neighborhood of the equilibrium will converge to the steady state and it does 
not matter how the dynamic paths are  moving in the  short run. In fact,  the 
dynamic path can be increasing,  or  decreasing,  or any  continuous function of 
time and,  therefore, in a totaUy stable dynamic system, it is meaningless to talk 
about  the short-run effects of any  shock. This is why  we will only  examine the 
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Now suppose that there is a permanent increase in the foreign weapon stock. 
We  want  to  know  how  the  long-run  equilibrium  values  of  the  endogenous 
variables are affected. 
Proposition 1.  In the long run, a permanent increase in the foreign threat leads to 
less consumption and more arms accumulation in the home country, but it does not 
alter the long-run capital stock in the home country. 
To  show  this  proposition,  we  differentiate  the two steady  state  equations, 
h(J., w, m*)  =  0 and g(J., w, m*) =  0, with respect to the foreign weapon stock 
m*,  and solve for d2/dm* and dw /dm*: 
Upon substituting all these  partial derivatives from Appendix 1: 
d2/dm*  =-J.Jf "(k)(dk/dm *)/A '  > 0, 
dwjdm*  =  J.j "(k)(dk /dm *)(dc/d2)/ A '  > 0, 
(19) 
(20) 
which are positive because dk/dm* <  0 and dc/d2 <  0 from Appendix 1 and 
J' <  0 from (17). Thus a permanent increase in the foreign weapon stock raises 
the total asset and the shadow price of the total asset in the home country. 
As u' (C) =  ).  and  dc/d2  =  1/u "(C) <  0,  the foreign military  threat reduces 
the long-run consumption:  dc/dm* =  (dc/d2)(d2/dm*) <  0. 
To see that the long-run capital stock is not affected, just observe the steady 
state condition �  =  0,  which is the same as 
f'(k) =  J +  p. 
Thus the long-run capital stock is determined by  the equality  of the marginal 
productivity of capital and the time discount rate plus the capital depreciation 
rate.  It needs to be pointed out that,  as shown in Section 5 later,  this result 
always holds no matter whether the utility function is separable or nonseparable 
in consumption and the weapon stocks. 
Since  the long-run  capital stock is  not  changed,  the  long-run  equilibrium 
value of arms in the home country is higher as a result of a higher total asset in 
the home country [see expression (20)]. In fact,  dw/dm*  =  dm/dm*: the long­
run increase in the total asset due to a permanent shock of the foreign military 
threat only  reflects the long-run increase in arms accumulation in the home 
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The driving force for Proposition 1 is the modified golden rule of the long-run 
capital accumulation. Since the optimal capital stock in the long run is deter­
mined by the time preference and the depreciation rate of capital in our model, 
the total resource available in the home country is fixed in the long run if the 
time preference and the capital depreciation rate remain the same. Facing more 
foreign military threat,  the home country has to choose 'less butter and more 
guns'. 
This analytical result is also depicted in Fig. 1. As a result of  a permanent 
increase in the foreign weapon stock, both the w  =  0 locus and the �  =  0 locus 
shift upward to the right. The unique perfect foresight path is from the initial 
equilibrium point A  to point B  and,  then,  from point B  to point C  - the new 
equilibrium.  At  the  new  equilibrium  point  C,  the  home  country  has  more 
weapon  accumulation  and less consumption (note that  consumption is a de­
creasing function of the shadow price .A). 
4.  The  short-run  effects of the  foreign military  threat 
While the long-run 'superneutrality' of the foreign military threat holds,  an 
equally,  if not more,  interesting question is how the short-run investment and 
military spending are affected by the military threat. It is natural to ask whether 
the foreign military threat accelerates capital formation in the home country or 
decelerates it. The scenario  here  resembles the  classical  case  of inflation  and 
growth. As  shown  by Sidrauski (1967),  inflation  is superneutral because  the 
long-run  capital  stock  is  independent  from  inflation.  But  in  the  short  run, 
Fischer (1979) demonstrates that inflation often stimulates investment along the 
transitional  path  towards  the  long-run  equilibrium.  If  we  follow  Fischer's 
approach here, we need to examine the impact of the foreign military threat on 
the negative eigenvalue J1z  given in Eq. (18b). It is obvious that the foreign threat 
does affect  the negative eigenvalue in (18b),  but the  differentiation  of J1z  with 
respect  to  the  military  threat  parameter  m
*  does  not  yield  a  definite  sign. 
However there exists another approach developed by Kenneth Judd (1983, 1985, 
1987) which is especially helpful in tracing the short-run impacts of exogenous 
shocks on endogenous variables. See also Dixit (1990) for a lucid presentation of 
the Judd approach. 
Following Judd (1987) and Dixit (1990), we suppose that initially, i. e., at time 
t  =  0,  the  home  country  is in  the  steady  state  corresponding  to  the  foreign 
military threat m
*
.  Now let the foreign military threat change as follows: 
x*(t)  =  m*  + sz(t),  (21) 
where z(t)  is the  intertemporal  change  in the  foreign  weapon  stock  and s  is 
a small perturbation of the military threat. In this paper,  we might take z(t) as 380  H.-f.  Zou/ Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19 (1995)  371- 393 
a step function of time and then a te mporary change in the foreign weapon stock 
during  time  ts;[t1,t 2] can  be  represented  by  z(t)= l  for  ts;[t1,t2] and 
z(t) = 0 otherwise. From this example, we can see that the temporary shocks can 
be easily  handled with this technique. Of course,  z(t)  can take other function 
forms such a ramp function and an impulse function. Eventually z(t) is assumed 
to be constant. 
Substitute x*(t) for m* into (15): 
A= Ah(A., w, m*  + ez(t)),  (22a) 
w = g(A. , w, m* + ez(t) ).  (22b) 
The  solution  to  the  dynamic  system (22)  will  be  smooth  in  both t  and e 
as  the  preference  and  technology  are  continuously  differentiable.  We  write 
the  solution  as A.(t, e)  and  w(t, e).  Differentiating (22)  with  respect  to e  and 
linearizing: 
(23) 
where all partial derivatives of h  and g  are evaluated at the initial steady state 
values�, w, and e  = 0. In the last section we already studied the Jacobian matrix 
in (23) and found its two eigenvalues [see Eqs. (18a) and (18b) ]. Next, to solve 
(23), we take the Laplace transforms of A.( t), w( t), and z(t) and denote them A(s), 
W(s), and Z(s) for s >  0,  respectively, 
A(s) = [  A.(t)e-•1dt, 
W(s) = [  w(t) e-'1dt, 
Z(s)  = [  z(t) e-•1dt, 
With these Laplace transforms, (23) is converted to or 
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[A,(s) 
J 
= [s- "J.h;_ 
W,(s)  - g;, 
(24) 
In deriving (24), we have used the fact that the initial total asset w(O) is given and 
cannot change,  i.e., w,(O)  =  0, but the shadow price of the total asset .A can jump. 
Thus we have dropped w,(O) and retained A.,(O) in (24). 
To  determine A.,(O)  in  (24),  we  note  that  the  existence  of  a  saddle-point 
equilibrium  in  our  model  implies  a  finite  total  asset  in  the  home  country: 
a  bounded  capital  stock  and  a  bounded  weapon  stock.  In  addition,  z(t)  is 
constant for  sufficiently large time t. Therefore W,(s)  is finite for all s > 0. In 
particular,  W,(s)  is finite when s  equals the positive eigenvalue J1.1. But  when 
s  = J1.1 , the inverse matrix in (24) is singular. To remove this singularity, the only 




Solving (25a)  for A.,(O): 
(26) 
In (26),  the  coefficient  for Z (Jl.d  is  positive  because [J:gw hm•  - J:hw9m•]  is 
positive upon substituting the relevant terms from Appendix 1 [which is equal 
to "J.b  f"(k)d k/ dm *  >OJ,  - "J.J1.1  hm• is also positive for hm• <  0 from Appendix 1, 
and (J1.1  - 9w) is positive for Jl.t  is larger than ("J.h;_ + 9w) and h;_ > 0 from both 
Eq. (18a) and Appendix 1. Therefore we have established: 
Proposition 2.  When the utility function is separable between consumption and the 
weapon stocks, any perfectly anticipated increase in the future military threat  from 
the foreign country raises the shadow price of  the total asset today in the home 
country. 
This interpretation of expression (26) is true because Z (J1.1) can be regarded as 
the present value of future military threat from the foreign country discounted at 
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For example, if the foreign weapon stock rises by one unit from time t  = To n, 
then, z(t)  = 0 for t � [0, T)  and z(t)  = 1 for t � [T, oo),  and 
In this case, the initial shadow price of the total asset will jump up by 
Since A.= u'  (c),  we can derive the initial response of consumption from the 
initial response of the shadow price. In fact, 
c,(O)  = A.,(O)/u"(c*) 
= {  [�gw  hm• - �hw9m•]  - �J11 hm• }(Jl.t  - 9w) -l Z  (Jlt}/u"  (c*). 
Hence,  when the utility  function is separable,  any  perfectly  anticipated future 
military threat reduces current consumption in the home country. 
With the knowledge of A.,(O) and w,(O) (the latter always equals zero), we can 
follow Judd (1987)  and substitute these two values back into (23) while setting 
t  = 0: 
J.,(O) = J:h;.A.,(O) + J:hm.z(O) 
= �h;.{[J:gwhm•- �hw9m•J- �Jlthm• }(Jl.l- 9w)-l Z(Jl.t} + �hm•z(O), 
(27) 
w,(O) = g;.A.,(O) + 9m•z(O) 
= 9;. {E"J:gwhm•- �hw9m•J- J:J.lthm• }(Jl.l- 9w)-l Z(Jl.t} + 9m•z(O).  (28) 
In (27), h;. > 0 and hm• < 0 from Appendix 1. Therefore, when the utility function 
is separable, a perfectly anticipated rise in the foreign arms accumulation speeds 
up  the  change in the initial shadow price while an  unanticipated rise  in the 
current  foreign  weapon  stock  lowers  the  speed  of  the  initial  change  in  the 
shadow price. 
Eq. (28) is the most important equation we have tried to derive so far. It tells 
us how the short-run or the current asset accumulation,  i.e.,  the sum of current 
investment and military  spending,  responds to military  shocks.  As g;. > 0  and 
9m• < 0  from Appendix 1, we have: H.�(. Zou/ Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19  ( 1995) 371- 393  383 
Proposition  3.  When the  utility function  is  separable,  an  unanticipated  rise in 
current  foreign military threat reduces current asset accumulation, and a perfectly 
anticipated  rise  in future foreign  military  threat  accelerates  the  current  asset 
accumulation. 
With Proposition  3  and  the  optimal  condition  between  capital  and  arms 
accumulation for the case of a separable utility function in consumption and the 
weapon stocks,  namely, v1 (m, m*)  = Aj'  (k),  we can show how current invest­
ment and military  spending are affected by  the foreign military  shocks. 
Proposition  4.  When  the  utility function is separable, an  unanticipated  rise in 
current foreign military threat reduces current investment, and a perfectly antici­
pated rise in future foreign military threat stimulates current investment. 
To prove  this proposition,  we  first  note  from Proposition  3 that,  with  an 
unanticipated  rise  in  current  foreign  weapon  stock,  there  will  be  an  asset 
decumulation in  the home country;  since 
either current investment or current military  spending or both will be reduced. 
In  addition,  from (27),  the  current  shadow  price  of  the  asset  is  likely  to  be 
reduced,  which is to say,  for u'(c)  =A  with a separable utility function,  current 
consumption is not going to be reduced as a result of an unanticipated rise in the 
current foreign military  shock. Then go back to the optimal condition for the 
case of a separable utility  function: 
v1  (m, m*)  = ).j'(k).  (10) 
Suppose that military  spending remains the same or is reduced. The left-hand 
side is larger because m*  is higher and m  is lower or remains the same [note 
v12(m, m*) >  0]. On the right-hand side, A  is likely  to  be lower from (27).  To 
restore  the equilibrium condition,  current investment needs to be cut. 
When there is an anticipated future increase in the foreign military threat,  the 
current asset accumulation is going to accelerate from (28). That is to say,  either 
current investment or current military spending or both will increase. It is very 
easy  to see that current investment is going to increase. Just look at the Euler 
equation, 
Jc;;._  =  6 +  p-f'(k).  (12) 
As  shown  in Eq.  (26),  the  current  shadow  price  A  rises  when  more  foreign 
military threat emerges in the future. Therefore, the optimal condition (12) calls 384  H.-f. Zou/  Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19 ( 1995)  371-393 
for more current investment and more capital formation to reduce the marginal 
productivity  of capital. 
We use Fig. 2 to illustrate the effects of an anticipated temporary rise in future 
military threat. In Fig. 2, anticipating a temporary rise of military threat in the 
future, the home country will cut consumption in the short run and invest more 
in both capital and arms stocks. This is depicted in the dynamic path from the 
initial equilibrium A  to point B. Since the threat is anticipated to be temporary 
in the future, with the accumulation of more capital and arms in the short run, 
the home country will gradually reduce its asset accumulation and increase its 
consumption; eventually the economy will restore its initial equilibrium A. The 
stage of asset decumulation is depicted on the dynamic path from point B  to 
point A  in Fig. 2. 
As a corollary  of Proposition 4,  when the utility  function is separable, more 
foreign military threat happening both today and in the future brings about an 
ambiguous impact on current investment in the home country. 
We provide  some  economic  intuitions  for  our  propositions  here.1 In  this 
model,  since  the  utility  from  consumption  is  independent  of  the  weapon 
stocks,  an unanticipated  rise  in  the current  foreign  military  threat  does  not 
change the marginal utility  of consumption and the steady  state level of con­




Fig. 2.  An anticipated  temporary  rise in the future military  threat. 
1 I  thank two anony mous referees  for providing further economic reasoning of these results and  for 
apply ing  these  results  to  explain  the  sty lized  facts  from  empirical  stud ies  on  military  spend ing, 
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an unanticipated increase in current military threat, requiring increased arma­
ments, can only be obtained by redirecting investment from capital formation to 
arms  accumulation (see Judd,  1985,  for  a  similar  result  about  the  effects  of 
current government spending on current consumption and current investment); 
therefore, current investment is reduced. On the other hand, anticipating more 
foreign  threat  in  the  future,  the  home  country  can  build  up  its  defense  by 
consuming less and investing more in both capital and arms today. More capital 
formation today means more output in the near future. With more output, more 
resource is available for more military spending,  which in turn leads to a larger 
weapon stock.  As a larger stock of  weapon in the home country improves its 
position  in the confrontation with the foreign  country,  the home country can 
afford to gradually slow down the rate of capital formation and channel more 
resource  to  consumption.  In the  long run,  with  a lower  investment  rate,  the 
capital stock returns to its equilibrium level which is determined by the modified 
golden rule and is not affected by any military shock. 
These  propositions  have  strong  empirical  implications.  As  summarized  in 
Deger  (1986),  econometric  studies  have  found  two  interesting  stylized  facts 
regarding the impact of military expenditure on growth. The first says that the 
direct effect of defense spending on growth rates across countries seems to give 
an ambiguous relationship. These studies show that there is no impact or even, 
contrary to expectation, a somewhat weakly positive impact. The second empir­
ically  validated  observation  is that  defense  spending  quite  definitely  reduces 
national  saving-income  ratios.  Our results  derived in  this paper  can  explain 
quite well these two stylized facts. Superneutrality (Proposition 1)  implies that 
the  direct  impact  of  defense  spending  and  military  shocks  have  little  or  no 
impact on the steady state capital stock. Thus the standard neoclassical result 
holds that the steady state growth rate is exogenously determined. Therefore, 
empirical studies of the effect of defense on growth would generally be inconclus­
ive since they generally use cross-section data and therefore reflect long-run or 
steady state parameters. On the other hand, Proposition 4 indicates that current 
increases in the military threat reduce current investment. This result seems to 
explain well why saving-income ratios are often significantly negatively related 
to  military spending.  Further,  as an anticipated future increase in the military 
threat stimulates current investment,  countries planning well for future threats 
would increase current investment to get the rewards of both higher defense and 
consumption in the  future.  So we have the  theoretical  results validating cases 
like South Korea and Taiwan because they have always been anticipating and 
preparing for  the  break  out  of  war  with North Korea  and  mainland China, 
respectively,  by accelerating their capital formation and arms accumulation. 
These propositions also offer insights on testing the relation between military 
spending and investment. As we said in the introduction, both military spending 
and  investment  are  endogenous  variables  in  our  model.  A  system  of  two 
simultaneous equations  in terms of  military  spending  and  investment  can be 386  H.-f Zou/  Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19  ( 1995)  371-393 
constructed to test how these two variables respond to current foreign military 
threat and future military  threat. For example,  we can propose the following 
form of regression equations: 
k  (t) = ¢ (LJ m*  (t), LJ m* (t + 1), fJ), 
m(t)  =  K(Am*(t), Am*(t +  1), fJ), 
where  LJ m*  (t)  represents  the  change  in  the  current  military  threat  and 
LJ m*  (t + 1) the expected change in future military threat; (]is other exogenous 
factors. 
5.  The case  of the nonseparable utility function 
Our  analysis  so  far  has  been  focusing  on  the  utility  function  separable 
between consumption and the weapon stocks. In this section,  we present our 
analysis  for  the utility  function nonseparable  between consumption and the 
weapon stocks. Recall that the general utility function U(c, m, m*) is assumed to 
have the following properties in Section 2 [Eqs. (1) and (2)]: 
U1  > o,  Uz > o,  U3 < o,  U11  < o,  U22 < o, 
With this general utility  function,  the current-value Hamiltonian is 
H =  U(c, m, m*) + A(f(k) - c- bw) + y(w- k- m). 
The first-order conditions for optimality  are 
U1 (c, m, m*) = A, 
U2(c, m, m*) = Aj'(k) , 
w  =  k + m, 
�/ A=b+p-f'(k), 
w = f(k)- c- bw, 
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These conditions are similar to, or the same as, conditions (9) to (14) in Section 2. 
Their explanations are more or  less the same and we  omit them here. 
We first note that in the steady  state, namely,�  =  0 and w =  0, condition (12') 
implies that the steady  state capital is again independent of military spending 
and military shocks:f'(k)  =  () + p. That is to say, even when the utility function 
is nonseparable,  the optimal steady  state capital stock is determined again by 
the modified golden rule. Hence we have  verified the superneutrality result for 
both separable and nonseparable utility  functions. 
To analyze the short-run effects, as in the case of the separable utility function, 
we first solve c, m, and k as functions of A, w, and m* and substitute the solutions 
c(A, w, m*), m(A, w, m*),  and k(A, w, m*)  into (12') and (13'), and again denote 
h(A, w, m*) =  () + p-f'(k(A, w, m*)), 
g(A, w, m*)  = f(k(A, w, m*)) - c(A, w, m*) - bw, 
then we have 
�  =  Ah(A, w, m*),  (15a') 
w  =  g(A, w, m*).  (15b') 
The  properties  of  these  functions  - c(A, w, m*),  m(A, w, m*),  k(A, w, m*), 
h(A, w, m*), and g(A, w, m*)- are presented in Appendix 2. In particular, we note 
that,  for the separable utility  function,  only  the sign gw is not determined;  but 
now with a nonseparable utility function, in addition to the sign of gw, we cannot 
determine the signs of hm• and gm•. These ambiguous signs will prevent us from 
drawing clear conclusions from the short-run analysis. Recall that 
A,(O)  =  {  [J:gw hm*  - J:hwgm*] - J:111 hm•} (fll - gw) -l Z (Jld, 
w,(O) =  g,﻽.A,(O) + gm.z(O) 
(26) 
=  g;. {[J:gwhm•  - J:hwgm•]  - ;:Ill hm• Hill  - gw) -l z {fld + gm*  z(O).  (28) 
Now the coefficients for the future military  threat Z (111) and the current military 
threat  z(O) are all ambiguous because hm•  and gm• do not have definite signs as 
a result of the nonseparability in the utility function between consumption and 
the weapon stocks. 
With the nonseparable utility function, consumption is still negatively related 
to the shadow price of the total asset as given by Eq. (B.2a) in Appendix 2. But 
even if A has a definite sign, from the change of A alone we cannot derive the effect 
on consumption because,  unlike in the case of a separable utility function,  the 388  H.-f. Zouj  Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19 ( 1995) 371-393 
simple relation between c and A in Eq. (9), u
' (c) 
=  A, does not hold any more; the 
new optimal condition is 
U1  (c, m, m*)  =  A.  (9') 
From (9'), it  is  clear  that  even  an  unanticipated military  threat rises  today, 
today's marginal utility  of consumption will be reduced since U13(c, m, m*)  is 
negative.  On  the  other hand,  an increase  in the home  military  stock m will 
increase  the  marginal  utility  of  consumption  due  to  the  assumption  that 
U12(c, m, m*)  is positive.  Therefore,  facing  a  current  increase  in  the  foreign 
military threat,  the home country  will cut its current consumption and spend 
more on weapon accumulation. 
What  is  the  effect  of  the  unanticipated  current  military  threat  on  current 
investment? With the separability in the utility function, we know that current 
consumption  is  not affected  and  current  investment  is  cut  as  a  result  of  the 
unanticipated current military threat. When the utility function is nonseparable, 
current consumption is going to be reduced as we have argued above. The effect 
on current investment may be ambiguous. We can provide the following reason. 
If the marginal utility is reduced significantly as a result of the current increase of 
foreign  military  threat,  namely,  U13 (c, m, m*)  is  large,  consumption  will  be 
reduced to a great extent and the short-run investment may not be affected.  On 
the other hand, if the marginal utility of consumption is affected by the foreign 
military threat very weakly, current consumption will not be reduced very much 
as  a  result  of  an unanticipated current  foreign  military  threat.  In  this  case, 
current investment will be partly sacrificed. In the extreme or the limit case when 
the marginal utility of consumption is independent of the current military threat 
and the weapon stocks,  namely,  U13(c, m, m*) =  0  and U12(c, m, m*) =  0,  we 
return to the separable utility  case where current consumption is not affected 
and all increased military spending will come at the cost of current investment as 
shown in Proposition 4 in Section 4. 
Similar reasoning applies to the effects of an anticipated military threat in the 
future. But we need to emphasize that, when the marginal utility of consumption 
is severely affected by the military threat, the short-run investment may even be 
sacrificed in order to build up the defense as soon as possible. 
6.  Summary 
This paper has made an attempt to answer the important question underlying 
many  policy  discussions and  empirical  studies:  How does military  spending 
affect investment and output growth? Our answer consists of the following:  (1) 
for the  most  general  utility  function,  superneutrality  holds  in  the  long  run; 
capital accumulation is independent of the military  threat; (2)  when the utility H.-f Zouj Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19  ( 1995) 371- 393  389 
function is separable in consumption and the weapon stocks,  any  anticipating 
military  tension  in  the  future  stimulates  current  investment  and  any  unan­
ticipated current military threat reduces current investment; (3) when the utility 
function is nonseparable between consumption and the weapon stocks,  a cur­
rent increase in the foreign military threat will directly reduce current consump­
tion, and current investment may be sacrificed as well. 
These theoretical results are helpful for us in explaining the empirical findings 
about  the  ambiguous  effects  of  military  spending  on  growth  rates  and  the 
negative impact of defense spending on national saving-income ratios, they also 
indicate new directions about how to statistically  test both military  spending 
and investment as functions of exogenous military  shocks;  in particular,  our 
theoretical  conclusions point out the importance of  treating  current military 
threat and future military  threat differently  in the regression analysis. 
Appendix  1 
In this appendix, we essentially undertake an analysis along the line of Arrow 
and Kurz (1970) and Mankiw (1987). Suppose that the total asset, the shadow 
price of the asset, and the foreign military threat are given. How does the home 
country  choose its consumption,  capital,  and arms? Totally  differentiating (9), 
(10), and (11),  we have 
0 
- A:"(k)] [  ::]  � [r  (k)dA -":�(�  m')dm'] .  v11  (m, m*) 
(A.l) 
It is easy to show that the determinant of the 3 x  3 matrix in (A.l ), denoted as 
A, is positive: 
A= u"(c)v1t(m, m*) + A.f"(k)u"(c) >  0. 
By Cramer's rule, 
dc/dA. = (v11  (m, m*) + A.f"(k))/A <  0,  (A.2a) 
dc/dm*  =  0,  (A.2b) 
dcjdw =  0,  (A.2c) 390  H.-f.  Zouj Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19 (1995) 371-393 
dm/dA. =f'(k)u"(c)/LJ < 0, 
dm/dm* =- v12(m, m*)u"(c)  > 0, 
dm/dw = A.f"(k)u"(c)/LJ  > 0, 
dk/dA. =-f'(k)u"(c)/LJ  > 0, 
dk/dm* = v12(m, m*)u"(c)/LJ  < 0, 







Substituting c(A., w, m*),  m(A., w, m*),  and  k(A., w,  m*)  into (12)  and (13),  and 
denoting 
h(A., w, m*) = 1J +  p- f'(k(A., w, m*) ), 
g(A., w,  m*) =  f(k(A., w,  m*)) - c(A., w,  m*) - Jw. 
Then,  we have 
l = A.h(A., w, m*),  (A.3a) 
w = g(A., w, m*) .  (A.3b) 
With (A.l),  the functions (A.3) have the following properties: 
h;.(A., w,  m*) = -f"(k) dk/dA. > 0,  (A.4a) 
hw(A., w, m*) = -f"(k) dkfdw > 0,  (A.4b) 
hm•(A, w, m*) = -f"(k)dk/dm* <  0,  (A.4c) 
g;.(A., w, m*) = f' (k) dk/dA.-dcfdA.  > 0,  (A.4d) 
9w(A, w, m*) =  f' (k) dk/dw - J,  (A.4e) 
9m•(A, w, m*) =  f'(k) dk/dm* < 0.  (A.4f) 
Note that the sign for 9w is not determined. H.-f Zou/  Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19  ( 1995) 371- 393  39 1 
Appendix 2 
As in Appendix 1, we suppose that the total asset,  the shadow price of  the 
asset,  and the foreign military  threat are given. We want to find out how the 
home country choose its consumption, capital, and arms. Totally differentiating 
(9'), (10'), and (11'), we have 
(B.1) 
Since U(c, m, m*) is assumed to be concave inc and m, it is easy to show that 
the determinant of the 3 x  3 matrix in (B.l),  denoted as L1", is positive: 
By Cramer's rule, 
dcjd.A.  = (U22 + .A.f"(k) - U1d'(k))/L1" <  0, 
dcjdw  =  - U12.A.f"(k)/L1"  >  0, 
dc/dm*  = [- U22 U13 + U12 U23- U13.A.f"(k)]/L1", 
dm/d.A. =  [U11f'(k)- U12]/L1" <  0, 
dmfdm*  = [- U11 U23 + U12 U13]jL1", 
dmjdw =  .A.f"(k) U11/L1" > 0, 










We note that, due to the nonseparability in the utility function, three derivatives, 
dcjdw,  dm/dm*,  and  dk/dm*,  do  not  have  definite  signs  in  the  expressions 
above. We can substitute c(.A., w, m*), m(.A., w, m*), and k(2, w, m*) into (12') and 
(13'), and again denote 
h(.A., w, m*)  =  b + p- f'(k(.A., w, m*) ), 
g(.A., w, m*)  = f(k(2, w,  m*) )- c(2, w,  m*) - bw. 392  H.-f. Zouj  Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19 ( 1995) 371- 393 
Then,  we have 
�  =  A.h(A., w, m*), 
w  = g(A., w, m*). 
With (B.l),  the functions (B.3) have the following properties: 
h;.(A., w, m*) = -f"(k)dk/dA.  > 0, 
hw(A., w,  m*)  = -f"(k)dk/dw  > 0, 
hm•(A, w,  m*) = -f"  (k)dk/dm*, 
g;.  (A., w, m*) = f'  (k)dk/dA.  -dc/dA.  > 0, 
gw(A., w,  m*) = f'(k)[dkjdw]- [dc/dw]- b, 









For the separable utility function, only the sign gw is not determined. Now with 
the  nonseparable  utility  function,  in addition  to  the  sign  of gw,  we cannot 
determine the signs of hm•  and gm•. 
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